Two hotshot crews (IHC 1 and 2) working a swing shift were supposed to burn a section of line and work toward each other. IHC 1 was supposed to start at the black edge where the previous shift’s burn ended and IHC 2 was supposed to start at the hangup/tie-in point and work toward IHC 1. There was a task force of agency engines and a contract dozer staged to support if needed. IHC 1 began firing without communicating this over Tac, and shortly after IHC 2 also began firing without any communication over Tac. IHC 2 started at the tie-in point but instead of working toward IHC 1, they started burning further down the line away from IHC 1. Still no communications over Tac while this was occurring. DIV (t) realized the burn is progressing farther past the tie-in point and traveled in UTV down to IHC 2 to inform them they went the wrong way and need to stop firing. They stopped firing and were released from the division early to bed down since the crew had travelled from a different location that day and was fatigued. IHC 1 finished the burn and tied in to IHC 2’s burn later that night.
In my opinion, had there been more values at risk in the area (homes directly adjacent to the burn, other crews working in the area, etc.) and/or more challenging weather conditions, this could have been a very serious issue with serious consequences. Luckily they were able to hang up the burn successfully for the night, but if they hadn’t been able to, there was potential for the fire to reach residences on the other side of the ridge sooner than planned or expected. I would consider this to be a near-miss likely caused by fatigue, poor communications, and other human factors that could have been at play as well. |
