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SAFENET

Wildland Fire Safety & Health Reporting Network

SAFENET Event Information

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SAFENET ID:

7HJJL2SAFE

Event Start Date:

08/07/2008 0000

Event Stop Date:

 

Incident Name:

IRON COMPLEX - BUCKHORN FIRE

Fire Number:

 

State:

California

Jurisdiction:

USFS

Local Unit:

Incident Type:

Wildland

Incident Activity:

Line, Support, Transport to/from, Readiness/Preparedness

Stage of Incident:

Extended Attack

Position Title:

Safety Officer 

Task:

Helibase And Helispots 

Management Level:

1

Resources Involved:

Helitack And Helibase Overhead 

Contributing Factors

Contributing Factors:

Human Factors, Other

Human Factors:

Decision Making, Leadership, Risk Assessment, Performance, Situational Awareness  

Other Factors:

Attitude and Culture allowed to persist 

Narrative

Describe in detail what happened including the concern or potential issue, the environment (weather, terrain, fire behavior, etc), and the resulting health issue.

This SAFENET deals with the lack of Helitack personnel on Helispots during Fireline Operations, the lack of Helibase support for such operations, and the IMT's and Helibase Managers enabling them to carry on this lack of support and attitude for far too many years. There were at least four (4) active Helispots on the Buckhorn Fire at any one time. Only one Helispot actually had any Helitack spike on site as Helispot Managers for days at a time. The other Helispots had no Helitack on site. There were sixty-six (66), Helitack personnel, excluding Overhead, at the Helibase everyday from July 24th through August 7th when I left the Incident. These people, for the most part, stayed at Helibase, with occasional missions to select Helispots for troop shuttles and the like, the same day and shuttled up and back to Helibase. Except for the Helispot(s) already listed, there were NO Helitack on any Helispots performing as Helispot Managers to do sling loads. The sling loads were managed daily by Resources on the firelines. Everyday, when sling loads were requested, Helibase would inquire something to the effect of: "Are there Helitack qualified personnel on site to safely accomplish the loads?" The answer was always affirmative. This is Helitack's job, not the Personnel on the fireline. I know of one DIVS that would hook up a slingload, then hike for an hour to another Helispot to get there in time to hook up another slingload. This is Helitack's job and is a distraction to a DIVS on an active Division. Helitack showing up on the fireline (1) without a tool, (2) with no IAP, (3) without having attended an Operational Briefing, (4) without all the required frequencies in all their radios, and (5) stating that the helicopter will come get them when asked what and where their Escape Routes and Safety Zones are. None of these are acceptable and warrant safety violations worthy of a SAFENET for each one.

Immediate Action Taken

Reporting Individual : please describe actions you took to correct or mitigate the unsafe/unhealthful event.

* Reinstate the Helispot Manager position and training (S-356) immediately. * Helibase Managers initiate, in every case, these Helispot Manager positions on Operational Helispots whereby they spike out on site, for days at a time, like the rest of us on the firelines. * No more flying Helitack up to the Helispots in the late mornings and off the Helispots in the evenings. This adds to unnecessary exposure, cost, and a waste of our tax dollars. * These Helispot Managers could also function as Lookouts, assist in Spike Camp Management, and assist on the firelines when there are no Helitack Operations. * As a Fireline Supervisor, whenever Helitack arrives on your Helispot, always query them: 1) Did you attend today's Operational Briefing, not just the Air OPS briefing? 2) Do you have a current IAP or Shift Plan? 3) Do you all have the IAP frequencies programmed into your radios. 4) Do you have a tool? 5) Remind them that they are Firefighters first and Helitack second. 6) Brief them on LCES. 7) Brief them on "The Operational Plan." 8) Allow them to manifest or whatever their mission was once all this is completed. South Canyon and Cramer Fires should be Lessons Learned for Helitack personnel regarding helicopters as Escape Routes and Safety Zones. Air-to-Ground and Deck frequencies are unsafe and insufficient for Operational Helispot use. Filing a SAFENET to draw attention to this long overdue problem. This wasn't only on the Iron Complex. This occurs on every fire anymore. As stated earlier, the IMT's and Helibase Managers have enabled this attitude and culture to prevail. It's time for a permanent change.There are a high percentage of Helitack personnel, stuck at Helibases, that would be more than happy to get up on the Helispots to efficiently and safely accomplish their missions.

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