SAFENET


SAFENET

Wildland Fire Safety & Health Reporting Network

SAFENET Event Information
Create Agency Response

SAFENET ID:
20220524-0001        [Corrective Actions]
Event Start Date:
05/15/2022 0700
Event Stop Date:
05/19/2022 0700 
Incident Name:
Hermits Creek/Calf Canyon Fire
Fire Number:
PJ6J 
State:
New Mexico
Jurisdiction:
USFS
Local Unit:
Santa Fe NF
Incident Type:
Wildland
Incident Activity:
Line, Support
Stage of Incident:
Extended Attack, Transfer of Command
Position Title:
Safety Officer 
Task:
Incident Communications 
Management Level:
1
Resources Involved:
All Incident Resources 
Contributing Factors
Contributing Factors:
Communications
Human Factors:
Leadership  
Other Factors:
 
Narrative
Describe in detail what happened including the concern or potential issue, the environment (weather, terrain, fire behavior, etc), and the resulting health issue.
When SW Team 1 took command of the North Zone of the Hermits Peak/Calf Canyon Fire communications were unable to be linked with ICP. The zoning of the incident required the current radio communications system to be split. The North Zone remained on the current system with the South Zone moving to their own system. During this transition there were no radio techs to switch the repeater link for the North Zone and install the repeater to cover ICP. For a duration of 4 days, the link with communications at the ICP was ineffective. This was highlighted on 5/17 with a red medical that required extraction by air. During the IWI communication were not able to function from ICP to the field and back. As the fire progressed, the repeater that was required for ICP was also needed to cover field personnel. Approximately, 300 personnel in the field had limited communications, with the only link established through a human repeater. During high fire behavior periods, several resources were forced to abandon tactics and leave the line because communications could not be established. The contributing factor, is the lack of radio techs available nationally. Orders were placed for radio techs days before transition and after transition. Orders for one week were returned unable to fill. Furthermore, radio operators were also unavailable. Orders were also placed for CAT personnel which was also UTF. The lack of communications personnel resulted in decrease support for the field and inability to coordinate IWI response and transport through ICP and the communications unit. About 1,200 firefighters were affected by the lack of communications with ICP.

The lack of communication personnel is limiting the "C" in LCES and needs to be resolved at the national level. The trend of unable to fill communications personnel has progressively gotten worse over the last few years and will most likely result in incidents without communications in the future.
Immediate Action Taken
Reporting Individual : please describe actions you took to correct or mitigate the unsafe/unhealthful event.
Field personnel had communications on the most fireline through the existing repeater system. Approximately, 25% of fireline personnel had no communications coverage which was unsatisfactorily resolved with a human repeater during the 4 days without a radio tech. Field Operations was utilized to coordinate response and transport for IWIs placing their self in a location with cell service and radio service. A radio tech was sent from the South Zone once their system was installed and working. That individual then moved to the North Zone on Day 4 to begin configuring the North Zone communication system. On 5/20, 4 days after transition, the North Zone communication system was operating providing coverage for ICP and the incident.

Other mitigations for correcting the problem took considerable time to no avail and included contacting commercial vendors, national guard and state compact agreements. The solutions did not pan out. Currently, land management agency fire organizations have no capacity for implementing a communications system on an incident without reliance on personnel outside of the fire organization.


Agency Response

20220524-0001-CA001

Return to Top