SAFENET


SAFENET

Wildland Fire Safety & Health Reporting Network

SAFENET Event Information
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SAFENET ID:
20180921-0001        [Corrective Actions]
Event Start Date:
09/19/2018 1335
Event Stop Date:
 
Incident Name:
Delta Fire
Fire Number:
P5L4L8 
State:
California
Jurisdiction:
USFS
Local Unit:
Mount Shasta
Incident Type:
Wildland
Incident Activity:
Line, Support, Transport to/from
Stage of Incident:
Other
Position Title:
 
Task:
 
Management Level:
1
Resources Involved:
Ground Support 
Contributing Factors
Contributing Factors:
Communications, Equipment, Human Factors
Human Factors:
Decision Making, Leadership  
Other Factors:
 
Narrative
Describe in detail what happened including the concern or potential issue, the environment (weather, terrain, fire behavior, etc), and the resulting health issue.
On the Delta Fire, eleven (11) Ground Support Contract Trucks with Drivers (VIPR Contractors) were responsible for transporting supplies, personnel, and misc to and from Delta Fire ICP and operational destinations on the Delta Fire. These contractors traveled hundreds of miles each day on Forest Service roads delivering personnel and supplies to Drop Points, Helibases, Staging Areas, etc. They were originally allowed to check out command radios. They were instructed in the use of command radios so that they could communicate with divisions. Communication by radio with divisions is necessary so that Ground Support drivers can interface with operations and operational ground traffic in way of avoiding potential accidents and mishaps with other operational ground traffic.

On or about 9/19/18, the logistics section chief (LSC) with told the aforementioned 11 Ground Support Drivers that they were to "return all command radios to the Communication Unit because Boise wanted the radios back". The Ground Support Unit Leader explained to the LSC that the use of command radios by Ground Support drivers is an essential safety protocol and that the use of command radios by Ground Support allows Ground Support drivers communication with operational ground resources in way of avoiding conflicts, accidents, mishaps and collisions.

Nevertheless she (the LSC) demanded that the command radios be returned to the Communication Unit, and they were returned according to her instructions.

My feeling is that the need to return the radios to Boise in no way outweighed the need for the radios on the incident. I feel that the LSC's demand to have the radios removed increased exposure to risk to the Ground Support drivers and to the operational personnel and equipment they encountered after the radios were removed. I think it was a bad decision, and that decision increased exposure to risk for a number of incident personnel for several operational periods.
Immediate Action Taken
Reporting Individual : please describe actions you took to correct or mitigate the unsafe/unhealthful event.
Ground support overhead (EQPMs) immediately expressed concerned to the Ground Support Unit Leader (GSUL). He (the GSUL) expressed concerns to the LSC, but she persisted in demanding that the command radios be turned in by the Ground Support drivers. I think also that the GSUL brought the concern to the SOFR.

Later in the incident (on or about 9/29/18), in way of trying to mitigate the poor decision made by the LSC, the Ground Support Unit Leader checked out three command radios for use by Ground Support drivers; however, because of the limited number of radios available (three radios for about 11 ground support drivers) there were still instances when Ground Support drivers were required to go to operational destinations without proper means of communicating with operational personnel.


Agency Response

20180921-0001-CA001

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