SAFENET


SAFENET

Wildland Fire Safety & Health Reporting Network

SAFENET Event Information
Create Agency Response

SAFENET ID:
20180728-0001        [Corrective Actions]
Event Start Date:
07/27/2018 1730
Event Stop Date:
 
Incident Name:
Chelan Hills Fire
Fire Number:
 
State:
Washington
Jurisdiction:
State
Local Unit:
Department of Natural Resources SES
Incident Type:
Wildland
Incident Activity:
Line
Stage of Incident:
Initial Attack
Position Title:
Firefighters 
Task:
Line Construction 
Management Level:
4
Resources Involved:
FS Helitack Module, DNR Engine Module, BLM 10 man crew, BLM Helitack Mod 
Contributing Factors
Contributing Factors:
Fire Behavior, Communications, Equipment
Human Factors:
Situational Awareness  
Other Factors:
 
Narrative
Describe in detail what happened including the concern or potential issue, the environment (weather, terrain, fire behavior, etc), and the resulting health issue.
The following incident occurred on an emerging incident on a steep hillside extending roughly 1,500 feet to ridge top of the banks of the Columbia river in the Chelan area. The hillside was North Facing and the Fuel type was grass, sage, and bitterbrush. The air attack consisted of 2 VLATs, 6 additional Tankers, and 7 Rotor wing aircraft on a 1000 acre and growing fire. Structures had already been lost and more were threatened. The flank where the incident occurred was of relatively low to moderate priority to the fires suppression.

A Forest Service Helitack crew along with multiple modules made up from four different agencies were assigned to construct direct hand line on an underslung flank of the emerging incident. The combined handvcrew began line construction at around 1600 hours. At that time multiple rotor wing aircraft had been holding the flank with bucket drops and fire activity was relatively low. After about 1.5 hours of line construction the lead saw team (myself + 1) reached a hotter section of the underslung line. At this point we decided to hold progression until the line dig was closer to our position. Simultaneously the 10 Person BLM hand crew arrived to the front of the progression. At this point it was decided that we would quickly control hot section of line together , before a bump was made. Flame lengths were 3-5" at this time.

Shortly after beginning work on the section I was alerted by my swamper who spotted a Type 3 Helicopter making a low drop directly in front of us. According to the swamper as well as other members of the crew the aircraft had come in and entered a hover before making the drop. I however was only able to see a rotorwash- driven flare up pushing towards myself and the crew. The crew scrambled and scattered down the hillside leaving behind tools, water bottles and dolmars. The large flare up lasted no longer than 1 minute, but due to the flashy fuel type and the close proximity to the fire it made for a hazardous situation.

The helicopters drop was unexpected and presumably not requested (by ground resources) The aircraft that made the drop was in fact my crews helicopter and the manager (on scene) attempted to make contact with the pilot but was unable to reach. The pilot later stated that he was unable to respond or acknowledge the radio call because he was focused on making the drop and holding his position. I recall glancing down and seeing the helicopter dip out of the river just below us and then returning to work, not expecting that it was coming to my location.

In debriefing with the pilot it was revealed that he had just returned from a fuel cycle, and had been directed (by AIR-ATTACK)to stay lower on the slope due to Fixed Wing Activity coming over the ridge line. In essence the helicopter was "sandwiched" between the upper 3rd of the slope and the lower third which did not require further bucket work. The pilot was aware that a crew was near the drop but did not know which crew it was. The pilot acknowledges that he failed to make contact for that reason.
Immediate Action Taken
Reporting Individual : please describe actions you took to correct or mitigate the unsafe/unhealthful event.
The lessons that myself, the pilot, and members of the crew can take away from this are as follows.

1) Make contact with ALL aircraft working in your area as soon as possible

2) If a pilot is uncertain of a radio message or unable to answer a call, they should consider aborting a drop and pulling away so communication can be established.

3) On an incident involving complex air operations it is important for ground resources and air resources to be cognizant of the associated increase in difficulty, and to allow a larger margin for safety around aircraft. The best way to achieve this margin is through thorough and frequent communication with air resources.


Agency Response

20180728-0001-CA001

Return to Top