The Redding IHC received an order to the Trail Mountain Fire on June 7, 2018. We arrived on the fire the morning of June 8 and were assigned to DIV Alpha.
We tied in with our Division Supervisor and the Bonneville Hotshot Crew. The plan was to backfire a small piece of ground that Bonneville had scouted out and prepped.
Adverse winds caused the burn to be shutdown by the current Incident Commander so the crews held the division through the operational period.
The plan between the Operations Section Chief, Division Supervisor, Bonneville Hotshot Superintendent and myself was to reinitiate the firing operation once conditions warranted.
The Bonneville IHC Superintendent had scouted the potential of going direct and with the forecasted weather, excessive snags and fire behavior that they had experienced the shift before, had decided the indirect option was a safer choice.
After taking all that information into consideration, I concurred with his assessment of the tactics being employed.
In addition, an approaching cold front was going to cause us to hold what ground we had and wait for favorable conditions.
Weather forecasted for the next two operational periods were temps in the high 60's to low 70's, RH's in the teens and high winds (10-15, gusts to 30) from the west/southwest.
Weather observations taken by the crew on 6/9 and 6/10 mirrored the forecasted weather.
On the evening of 6/9 we (Redding IHC and Bonneville IHC) again confirmed with the Division Supervisor and Operations Section Chief that the firing plan was still the plan once conditions allowed. We were also informed that there was a new ICT3 on the incident.
On the morning of 6/10, the new Incident Commander Type 3 (ICT3) arrived at Drop Point 15 and met with myself and the Bonneville IHC overhead.
The ICT3 wanted to take a look at the potential of going direct. He was going to scout the line and invited us to join him.
The Redding IHC Captains and Crew Boss Trainee accompanied the Bonneville CRWB trainee and the ICT3 during the scouting mission from the top of the line. I drove around to the bottom of the fire line and scouted towards them.
When we met up, we had a discussion about the tactics we planned on employing.
The ICT3 explained to us that "normally the Incident Commander doesn't get involved in tactics but in this case he saw a need to intervene and that if he hadn't come up there, we would've continued to do nothing".
He believed he saw an opportunity to pick the fire up direct and that we had to get the firing option out of our minds. He reiterated over and over that our planned firing operation was not going to happen.
The ICT3 turned to the Bonneville CRWB(t) and told him that if his crew didn't want to take the assignment (direct) that he'd find another hotshot crew to complete the assignment and send them to another, mellower assignment.
The ICT3 turned his attention to me and asked my thoughts on the section of line. I told him that I had major concerns with committing the crew on the piece of ground with all the snags, especially with the windy conditions forecasted. I also had concerns with being able to go direct and actually contain the fire due to the uneven edge, fuel loading and numerous spot fires. He exclaimed that he didn't see any more hazard trees than any other fire we were assigned to.
The ICT3 explained to me that we could use MIST (Minimum Impact Suppression Tactics) in the mixed conifer fuel type. He questioned our knowledge and experience of tactics we wanted to employ and he wouldn't listen to our concerns.
I explained to him that in my opinion, the direct option in that fuel type wasn't a sound tactic and that the planned firing operation would be the safest and most efficient tactic. If successful, we'd have a straight and solid containment line with limited exposure to the crews.
He vehemently disagreed with me and told me that there would be no firing operation and that, again, we had to just get that option out of our minds.
The ICT3 then explained to us that he was the leader and we were the subordinates and that we needed to do what we were being told. I disagreed with him and told him that his leadership style was extremely subpar and that the disrespectful way he was trying to bully us into taking an assignment was unprofessional, unwarranted and unappreciated.
I then again informed him that we wouldn't be committing the crew into the drainage due to the fire line conditions and our safety concerns.
We (Redding IHC and Bonneville IHC) requested a meeting with the Operations Section Chief. We told him of the interaction with the ICT3 and he was surprised as he and the ICT3 had not discussed any changes to the plan of burning the line if conditions gave us the opportunity to do so. |
