I was not able to take notes during my response, all times and sequences are approximate.
Following sequence follows events occurring while I was assigned as IC and OSC.
I was ordered as a Type 3 IC. Incident was an evolving fire. Fire had increased in size from an initial report of 600 acres when I received the assignment (1130) to a reported 6000 acres during my response (1900).
Weather was reported to me as approximate winds SW 20-25 with Gusts of 30; temp of >65 degrees; RHs of low teens to single digits. Terrain was reported as broken with open ground, mesa tops, and steep slopes. Fire Behavior was running, spotting, with single and group tree torching. I was informed that an ICT5 was in command and that dispatch had no communication with the IC by either radio or cell phone and that communications were sketchy at best in that area. Resources on scene were reported as various VFDs and a state T2 inmate crew and that there was no communication with those resources. I was not in communication with the state , all communications were relayed to the state through dispatch. Direct communication with the state was not established by myself or the state while I was the IC.
I called dispatch at approximately 1600 and requested an update on the fire condition and was told that the fire was approximately 3000 acres and that the fire had reportedly spread into neighboring states. I requested the availability of a Type 2 team because the fire had spread to two additional GACCs. At this point I believed that the complexity was exceeding my ability as a single resource without support. Dispatch informed me that there were no T2 teams available but that a T2 short team might be available. I discussed with the dispatcher that the fire was now in three GACCs and that coupled with a lack of organization and poor communication that the complexity would require a higher level of supervision and support. Dispatch then contacted me and informed me that my request for a T2 short team and the T3 team had been denied by the State representative. I then requested four DIVS, three Strike Teams of Engines, and asked for the availability of Type 1 crews. My intent was to have resources that would have the ability to move around the fire and have adequate supervision to address LCES. Also, to have resources that would be available for the next shift, instead of two days later. I considered this a very basic order based on the updates I was receiving. I, then, received notification from dispatch that my additional resources had been denied, also. My next request was for a Airattack platform and Helitack Crew for the next day, this request was filled by dispatch. I requested a radio kit with handheld radios and a repeater to mitigate the communication issues. I requested that dispatch make a log entry stating the condition of the fire, lack of communication, and denial of resource orders. I believe that a lack of communication with the state representative prevented a clear picture of my intent with these orders.
At approximately 1900 I was informed by dispatch that the fire was approximately 6000 acres and had confirmation that the fire had spread to neighboring states. Dispatch stated that the ICT5 had made a cell call to dispatch and given an update, but that there was no communication with the IC at the time. resources on scene in neighboring states were unknown. Dispatch informed me that my request for a communications kit was denied. I requested that dispatch make a log entry, reiterating the status of the fire, lack of communications and qualified resources.
I arrived on scene at approximately 2030 at the local VFD station. Made contact with the IC and returned to local town to meet with his supervisor, the FMO, at approximately 2200. I had an extended conversation with the FMO about the fire and local resources, and history of the area. At that meeting it was decided that the FMO would assume IC of the fire and that I would remain as the OSC, because of his local knowledge and relationships with the local departments and civilians.
These issues where on-going through the time I was assigned. Some were mitigated, communications continued to be a critical problem and was not appropriately addressed or resolved.
Resulting Safety Issues: Safety issues address concerns occurring while both the IC and OSC were on scene working together (3/9-12/18). An appropriate level of LCES was never established while I was on the fire. There was a complete lack of any effective ground based communications equipment on the incident. Lack of command channel allowing for coordination of safety and resources. Lack of effective equipment to establish tactical frequencies with resources. VFDs would not check out radios to established tactical communications.
There was no Delegation of Authority for four days. Resulting in confusion as to the ability to order support and suppression resources, or equipment. Delegation of Authority arrived with the wrong name on it.
There was no state liaison assigned to the fire for four days. Resource orders were consistently denied, without explanation. No resources were available to assign to the north or east flanks of the fire, which continued to spread. This created a large amount of unnecessary tension with neighboring states.
Lack of adequate supervision on the fireline for three days equal to incident complexity. Complexity analysis were completed but not addressed by the hosting agency.
No IAPs were issued for four days because of a lack of support positions, printers, no established unified command with local resources, lack of a communications plan, and remoteness of that area.
State did not meet with local VFD chiefs to unify command. Lack of red carded personnel within the VFDs was cited. However that did not affect their daily engagement on the fire. Lack of Red Cards is not a acceptable excuse for not engaging with small local resources in their areas of operations. |
