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SAFENET Event Information
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20170629-0001        [Corrective Actions]
Event Start Date:
06/26/2017 1730
Event Stop Date:
Incident Name:
Breeze Fire
Fire Number:
Local Unit:
Boise District
Incident Type:
Incident Activity:
Stage of Incident:
Initial Attack
Position Title:
Incident Commander Type 3 
Dozer line construction 
Management Level:
Resources Involved:
Equipment, Engines 
Contributing Factors
Contributing Factors:
Human Factors:
Other Factors:
Critical hazard not identified, oil and gas pipeline locations 
Describe in detail what happened including the concern or potential issue, the environment (weather, terrain, fire behavior, etc), and the resulting health issue.
The evening of June 26 a lightning storm passed over the Boise District which started multiple fires. Crews quickly responded to the new starts, a particular set of fires started near Mayfield Idaho that posed the most risk to life and property. These three fires were reported at 17:30 posing an immediate threat to life and property, Soles Rest subdivision was at greatest risk with approximately 20 primary residences. Fire behavior was erratic with passage winds, high rates of spread were observed in grass and sage with 4-6' flame lengths. Upon arrival at 18:00 all three fires were approximately 200 acres and were named the Breeze Fire. One engine module consisting of two type 4 engines with superintendent, a dozer, a water tender, and a battalion chief were assigned to the fires. The battalion chief took the role of Incident Commander and immediately ordered two additional engines, an additional dozer, and an air attack with SEATS to respond. The initial resources were briefing on known hazards including oil and gas pipelines running through the fire area, which were identified by markers and a digital map layer which each resource had. The superintendent was assigned to the dozer to help mitigate the potential of crossing pipelines and to improve safety measures associated with fire behavior and dozer operations. A Tesoro rep, which arrived on scene, was briefed on the plan of action and tied in with the superintendent to provide guidance on pipeline locations and risks. With limited resources, the IC decided to utilize the dozers to go direct as possible and connect the three fires together firing any indirect line. The second dozer on order was intended to be inserted strategically on the opposite end of the fire opposite side of the know pipe line. The IC was briefed by the rep that the Tesoro line was shallow in the area, potentially only 20" deep. This information was passed to all resources which were instructed to not cross the line. In further conversation the IC discovered there were two different pipeline companies with lines in the area (Williams Pipeline and Tesoro Pipeline). The pipeline location layer was only released to the BLM by the Williams Pipeline company, not the Tesoro, which was only identified by rough locational markers. At 20:20 the second BLM dozer arrived on scene and was briefed on hazards, line construction continued late into the evening eventually being completed at 21:45 stopping the progression of the fire at 1800 acres. This left only one small gap over the pipeline which was secured by wet line. Crews and equipment remained diligent throughout the incident to not cross pipelines keeping the incident staffed on both sides. The day following the containment of the incident Tesoro reached out to the BLM stating that the rep, on more careful examination of the fire, realized their pipeline had been crossed by suppression equipment in two different locations. These locations were not well defined by visual markers.
Immediate Action Taken
Reporting Individual : please describe actions you took to correct or mitigate the unsafe/unhealthful event.
As the Incident Commander being familiar with the known hazards in my theater of operations I was sure to brief all resources on the pipelines and protocol associated with them. The superintendent's primary mission was to identify pipeline hazards for dozer operations both visually on the landscape and through use of the map layers. The two engines and additional dozer assigned to the incident were split providing support on each side of the pipelines to prevent a crossing. Fires were connected with dozer line and fired to prevent segmentation of resources due to pipeline location having a lack of resources assigned with multiple fire starts. It was fully believed that the incident went very smooth and all hazards were identified and mitigated until Tesoro reached out after the incident stating their line had been crossed by equipment. The Williams Pipeline Company which has released their line location layer to the BLM was easily mitigated and not compromised. I am currently pursuing the release of Tesoro's line location layer, which has been held from the BLM as sensitive information. I have also made recommendations to Tesoro and Williams from a fire perspective on ways to help mitigate the very real risk to fire personnel around their line. This includes the suggestion of prebuilt, pre identified crossing locations at set distances that are sufficient for dozer and engine crossing. Primarily the "Sensitive Line Location Layer" from Tesoro is desired, the Boise District BLM has been very successful in hazard mitigation with our current layer provided by the Williams Pipeline Company.

Corrective Actions


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