 |
Name : (Optional) |
|
|
Phone : (Optional) |
|
|
EMail : (Optional) |
|
|
Date Reported : |
11/07/2003 |
|
Agency/Organization : |
BLM |
|
|
|
|
State Agency : |
|
|
|
|
|
Other Agency : |
|
|
|
|
|
Event Date : |
10/28/2003 |
|
Local Time : |
22:00 PM |
|
Incident Name : |
OLD |
|
Incident Number : |
CA-SBF- |
|
State : |
CA |
|
|
|
|
Jurisdiction : |
USFS |
|
Local Unit : |
SBF |
|
Incident Type : |
|
Incident Activity : |
|
Stage of Incident : |
|
Wildland |
|
Line |
|
Extended Attack |
|
Position Title : |
Engine, Type V |
|
Task : |
Holding For Backfire |
|
Management Level : |
1 |
|
Resources Involved : |
Multiple Engines, Crews, And Overhead |
|
Contributing Factors : |
Human Factors |
|
Human Factors : |
Decision Making; Fatigue; Leadership; Performance; Risk Assessment; Situational Awareness |
|
Other Factors : |
|
| Describe in detail what happened including the concern or potential issue, the environment (weather, terrain, fire behavior, etc), and the resulting safety/health issue. |
|
On October 28th, 2003 at 1000, a BLM engine reported for duty to the Old Fire on the San Bernardino National Forest. The Engine was placed in a staging area and within 15 mobilized to a division assignment located on HWY 18, east of Rim of the World High School. At the time of this assignment, the crew had not received a briefing, shift plan, or other information concerning their assignment. They were totally unaware of the strategy and tactics being implemented on this fire, what their assignment was, who their supervisor was and how to contact that person.
The engine "fell in line" with a group of engines that appeared to be assigned to holding for a major backfire operation along HWY 18. This backfiring operation was already in progress when the engine arrived.
By 1200, the backfire had begun to compromise the highway when a crown fire in mature pine crossed in front of the engine. Crews and engines were mobilized to contain this slop over.
Around 1300, backfiring operations resumed. The engine continued to work until 0300 on October 29th when the backfiring operation ultimately failed. During the time they were assigned, communications, chain of command, and clear instructions concerning the assignment were never provided.
At 0300, the engine was moved to a safety zone. At 0530, the engine was remobilized to staging area closer to the aforementioned backfiring operation. At 1000, the engine was released from staging back to camp, where they attempted to check-in, since they were directly assigned to the fire upon arrival.
Confusion occurred between the fire and the local district as to where the engine was supposed to report. After several hours, the engine was assigned to the local district for IA. They finally went off the clock at 1500, although that was not the direction of the Forest. The Engine Boss unilaterally decided to go off the clock. No meals or lodging were provided by the government.
The following safety violations occurred.
1) Engine was never briefed on assignments, strategies, tactics, fire behavior, fire weather, or any other incident information.
2) Communications with the supervisor were never established and the supervisor was never identified.
3) The number of engines, tenders, emergency vehicles and media traffic along HWY 18 compromised the engines only escape route back to the safety zone. Observed and predicted fire behavior indicated that there was a high potential for entrapment along that road. If this had occurred, incident resources would have been stranded in a traffic quagmire.
4) Safety zone was too small to accommodate the number of vehicles and personnel assigned, should they have had to use it.
5) Engine crews were assigned to a 33-hour shift. This fire was clearly not in the initial attack phase. Shift length guidelines were not adhered to. |
| Reporting Individual : please describe actions you took to correct or mitigate the unsafe/unheathful event. |
|
It is painfully clear to me, as the supervisor of this engine crew, that incident management on this fire was completely focused on this backfire operation as a last ditch effort to save a large residential area. In their zeal to accomplish this mission, they were willing to violate at least 3 of the 4 LCES standards, and a majority of the 10 Standard Fire Orders. Nearly all the watch-out situations were apparent on scene and many of the recent Thirtymile action items were totally ignored.
Based on personal experience, and after lengthy discussions with others who have experienced fires in southern California, the general feeling is "well that's how they do it out there".
Therefore, if that's how they do it out there, my corrective action is to not send any more of my personnel into that situation.
The problems exhibited in this situation appear to be widespread and accepted by the agencies involved.
I would recommend that this fire be reviewed. I suspect that review will reveal an attitude, which appears to me to place the value of residential areas above the safety of the fire fighters. |
AGENCY CORRECTIVE ACTIONS |
| Reserved space for Agencies Supplemental corrective Actions. |
|